Catharsis, a dramaturgical tool to construct a new frame in social politics

The present critical essay has the intention to discuss the meaning and purpose of the concept of catharsis, in the works of Aristotle, and Bertolt Brecht. Therefore this paper has the aim to establish catharsis as a political tool to construct the internal vision of a nation or culture by using the audience engagement in the dramatic form.
Under this outline I will review Aristotle’s perspective on emotions and his moral vision of the politics, and the aesthetical perspective in Brecht’s artistic development of Epic Theatre.
Aristotle and Catharsis
PHAEDRA: Many a time in night’s long empty spaces
I have pondered on the causes of a life’s shipwreck.
I think that our lives are worse than the mind’s quality
would warrant. There are many who know virtue.
We know the good, we apprehend it clearly.
But we can’t bring it to achievement. (…)[i]
In order to value the concept of catharsis established by Aristotle in his Poetics, it is necessary to develop the idea of what he understood as the main ambition of art and how he visualized the internal dramaturgy of tragedy. In consequence we will be able to recognize which was the importance of arousing emotions in the cultural and political frame of Greek society.
Aristotle’s refers to catharsis when he establishes: “Tragedy is the imitation of an action which is serious, complete and substantial. (…) It is drama (that is, it shows people performing actions) and not narration. By evoking pity and terror it brings about the purgation (catharsis) of those emotions.“[ii]
The possibility of understanding exactly what catharsis means seems to be reasonably difficult since Aristotle himself did not offer a definition per se in his Poetics; what we know about catharsis (purgation) is its finality, what it should produce, although until this point it seems uncertain what the main reason to set catharsis as the ultimate purpose of a well-constructed tragedy was.
According to Aristotle “art creates a merely simulacrum” of the ideal created from God; and it has to “encourage the emotional response, far from the rational and considered stance of genuine seeker after truth.”[iii]
Therefore, for Aristotle the purpose of tragedy as a major form of art was to construct a simile of reality, which would engage the audience in a deep moving experience. According to W.W. Fortenbaugh in his book Aristotle on Emotion, “Aristotle’s analysis of emotion made clear the relationship of emotion to reasoned argumentation. By constructing thought or belief as the efficient cause of emotion, Aristotle showed that emotional response is intelligent behaviour open to reasoned persuasion.”[iv]
Hence, emotions were an essential element of Aristotle’s vision of reason and consequently of truth; especially those that he considered cognitive, that is emotions which made conscious the ability of thinking:
Once Aristotle focused on the cognitive side of emotional response and made clear that an emotion can be altered by argument because beliefs can be altered in this way, it was possible to adopt a positive attitude towards emotional appeal. [v]
In this sense, emotions were an effective manner to call for the audience’s attention in order to accomplish an intelligent reading of the theatrical events. Aristotle’s research led him to realize the importance of emotional knowledge in the perception of reality and the further complex mental process inspired by it. Since, in Aristotle’s perspective: “The word ‘reason’ includes all the effects which can be produced by language: proof or refutation of an argument, the arousal of emotions like pity, terror, anger and the others, the capacity to exaggerate and understate.”[vi]
Ergo, Aristotle’s new perspective to confront the benefits of theatre and fundamentally tragedy was extremely revolutionary; especially when we consider the formal perspective introduced by Plato in the visualization of theatre. Plato asseverated a strong critic on Greek playwrights “for playing upon feelings that are unintelligent and destructive of man’s reasoning capacity.”[vii] Aristotle, who saw an important benefit in the emotional appeal with the purpose of stimulating reflection, challenged Plato’s demeaning conception of theatre.
As a result, the single emotional status usually attributed to catharsis, opens now a new perspective of analysis. Pity and terror were cognitive emotions selected for very particular motives by Aristotle, with the aim to build a proper tragedy and produce the final state of purgation. Regarding this aspect, Fortenbaugh declares: “Tragedy was associated with two emotions which were recognised not only as intelligent and reasonable responses but also as important controls in determining the kinds of actions depicted in tragic poetry.”[viii]
Now, I believed that we can comprehend better why the final purpose of tragedy was an emotional one. When Aristotle referred to the actions of a tragedy as: “serious, complete, and substantial”[ix]; he was requesting an emotional essence, that pity and terror must bring into the tragic scheme. This is the main reason for Aristotle to demand of tragedies not to show:
“a virtuous man moving from good to bad fortune [which] is, according [to him], neither fearful nor pitiable but rather shocking or revolting and a vicious man changing from bad to good fortune appeals neither to ordinary human sympathy nor to pity and fear.”[x]
Accordingly to this, then, it is a valid inquiry to ask: what did pity and terror offer from the Aristotle’s reasonable perception into the Greek tragedy? In Fortenbaugh’s interpretation, Aristotle’s analyses accomplished to perceive that “fear was shown to be not simply a shuddering but also and essentially an expectation of destructive or painful evil and when pity was referred not only to the thought of unmerited suffering but also to educated men who also reason well (…).”[xi]
Once established the core purposes of fear and pity, it is translucent to understand how Aristotle considered catharsis as a basic element of his “theory of benefit through purgation.”[xii] Then, the sensible person was the one who managed to feel empathy for human beings involved in unfair events because of damaging energies. Thus, these individuals were educated through tragedy to reinforce a moral perspective in their world-vision, which was for Aristotle the definitive method to construct a strong politics and therefore a better society.
James Jerome Walsh in his text Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Weakness declares that for the Greek philosopher: “the moral strong man has the right rule or reason but the wrong desires, and he conquers his desires.”[xiii], consequentially, he adds: “(…) the desires of the temperate man are such that he is immune to temptation.”[xiv] Nevertheless, the moral person was not the character depicted in Greek tragedies, even when its heroes “should be people of high degree and reputation.”[xv] From Aristotle’s outlook, the main characters in tragedies usually committed the act of:
Harmatia (‘error’, which) is the failing in understanding of moral character which leads someone to disastrous choice of action: a choice which arouses our pity because it is both catastrophic and made deliberately but not out of wickedness, and arouses our terror because we identify with both innocence and the helplessness of the person who makes the choice.[xvi]
Thence, the dramaturgical configuration of the Greek tragedy was not conceived to expose the perfection of a moral character, but it was envisaged to provoke the critical thinking regarding intricate human actions in order to awake the desire of higher perfection in personal moral grounds. In consequence, temperance was a virtue expected to be develop in each Greek individual in order to built up a stronger moral community and society; which was encouraged by the educative-emotional-reasonable structure of tragedy.
Regarding the moral character and the virtue’s aim involved in it, Fortenbaugh settles that Aristotle says:
As a perfection of man’s emotional side, moral virtues makes correct the judgments and goals involved in emotional response. A courageous man, for example, becomes frightened and desires safety only when it is right to do so. When the situation calls for endurance, he perceives this and responds boldly because it is noble to do so. (…) What moral virtue does not make correct is the means-end deliberation occasioned by emotional response. (…) Moral virtue makes the goal correct, but it cannot make the deliberation correct. [xvii]
Therefore, tragedy, as a simulacrum of reality, is composed to confront the spectator with plausible circumstances, in order to arise purgation of those emotions that may escort us into mistaken considerations of facts, which is exactly when harmatia takes place.
In Euripides’ tragedies such as Medea and Hippolytus, we can perceive how both Phaedra and Medea suffer from the unreliable nature of their reasons. Their goals own moral virtues, but their means are erroneous, since they have not been able to educate themselves in the perception of empathy.
From what Aristotle explains in the Ethica Nicomachea, this is due to that: “for each person what is wished is what seems (good to him); but different things, and indeed contrary things [could be wished for], if it turns out that way, [they will] appear good to different people.”[xviii]
This expectation of moral realization subsequent to the attendance to a tragedy conformed an important part in the political vision of Aristotle for the Greek society. Since, he recognized the convoluted disposition of wishing and therefore the threat existent in it for the welfare of people.
According to Andrés Rosler in his text Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle: “He is more concerned with the community as a whole than with the fate of a particular individual.”[xix] In consequence, the developing of moral virtues in each human being was a strong strategy to insurance the correct moral attitude in the lawgivers and in every citizen to “enable them to perform their constitutional role as political, legal and judicial decision-makers.”[xx]
Hence, Rosler concludes: “he is far from assuming that subjects are faceless pawns without any worth whom the rules push about on the chessboard. On the contrary, on Aristotle’s view, the subjects are actors of their own political drama.[xxi]
Bertolt Brecht and Astonishment, or the Catharsis of Ideas
PELAGEA VLASSOVA: It wasn’t reason that made me weep. But when I stopped, reason had something to do with that. What Pavel did was right.[xxii]
The German director, playwright, poet, and dramaturge Bertolt Brecht has been deeply recognized in the theatrical practice for his revolutionary vision of what has been known as the Epic Theatre. Then, the Epic Theatre has been built up as a concept in permanent opposition with the theatrical conception developed by Aristotle, in such a manner that a dialectical conversation between both dramaturges has been ascertained for decades.
This antagonism was, above all, centred in Brecht’s attitude to refuse catharsis: “the purging of emotions through identification with the destiny which rules the hero’s life.”[xxiii] Since, he expressed regarding “feelings [that they] are private and limited. Against that the reason is fairly comprehensive and to be relied-on.”[xxiv]
Therefore, from these initial statements, we can sense that Bertolt Brecht did not recognize the cognitive capacity of emotions related with reason that Aristotle attributed to them, and that he was confident in the benefits of pure materialistic reason in order to construct his dramaturgy and world political conception.
Nevertheless, in order to start analyzing these provocative declarations in the proper artistic context, it is necessary to comprehend what Brecht understood as the purpose of art. Topic that he confronted when he asked: “Why shouldn’t art try, by its own means of course, to further the great social task of mastering life?”[xxv]
‘Mastering life’ in Brecht’s conception had two different although complementary implications: first, a philosophical one, since he believed that was the future of theatre, and second, a social-political one, given that he said: “If any theatre is capable of going ahead of its public instead of running after, then it is a theatre of the working class.”[xxvi]
Thus, this social-political-philosophical task took the aesthetic and discursive shape of the Epic Theatre, which he described as essentially dynamic, with a pedagogical and entertainment objective, not interested in the ‘identification’ process of the spectator with the characters portrayed on the stage and, it did not have catharsis as the main object of its dramaturgy.[xxvii]
Consequently, if catharsis was rejected as the main goal of his dramaturgical structure: what was the final state of his theatrical construction? In the words of Walter Benjamin, in his book Understanding Brecht:
The art of epic theatre consists in arousing astonishment rather than empathy. To put it as formula, instead of identifying itself with the hero, the audience is called upon to learn to be astonished at the circumstances with which he has his being. [xxviii]
Hence, the purpose to produce the state of astonishment, for Brecht, was the opportunity to start an intellectual dialogue between the spectator and the conditions exposed on theatre. For this reason the level of shock that epic theatre had the mission to produce in the audience commenced an interesting correspondence with the idea of catharsis in the Aristotelian view.
Catharsis was possible if pity and terror were revealed by the solid structure of tragedy. Accordingly Brecht spoke of two main concepts that helped in the development of astonishment: Verfremdung and Gestus.
Laura Bradley in her text Brecht and Political Theatre defines Verfremdung as “‘estrangement’ or ‘defamiliarization’”, which is an interesting conception since most of the times has been translated as ‘alienation’. In her opinion the “Verfremdungseffekt (estrangement effect) is thus another method of provoking critical reflection and promoting spectator to question phenomena which they usually take for granted. As such, it is an important tool for promoting critical consciousness.”[xxix]
Thus, this process of detachment created by Brecht through the estrangement effect was meant to educate the spectators regarding the proper scientific new attitude demanded by the artist:
These spectators were prepared to mobilise their entire experience, intelligence and fighting spirit, to acknowledge objectives and handicaps, to make comparisons and objections, and to criticise the conduct of the characters or to generalise so as to apply it to their own situation and learn from it.[xxx]
In consequence Brecht did not expect from his audience to feel empathy for the events or the characters illustrated on the stage. He waited for them to recognize the distance, and therefore, to have the mental space to realize the context and political frame of the social circumstances. According to this, Benjamin said: “Epic theatre, then, does not reproduce conditions, but, rather, reveals them. This uncovering of conditions is brought about through the process being interrupted.”[xxxi]
Brecht stressed the point of exposing conditions, since he believed that “every act comes from a realization. There’s really no such thing as acting on impulse. There again the intellect is lurking in the background.”[xxxii] In Bertolt Brecht’s perspective the real possibility of change existed only in the reasonable process of understanding why are we in the situation that we find ourselves. Once the conditions of a certain position came into acknowledge, people will have the power to decide and transform themselves and their reality.
In order to expose the conditions for the rational understanding, Brecht made use of the concept Gestus, which is explained by Benjamin in the following way:
The epic theatre is gestural. (…) First, the gesture is falsifiable only up to a point; in fact, the more inconspicuous and habitual it is, the more difficult it is to falsify. Second, unlike people’s actions and endeavours, it has a definable beginning and definable end (…) Hence, the interruption of an action is one of the principal concerns of the epic theatre.[xxxiii]
Therefore, Gestus is present in the performance of his plays as in the internal configuration of the written text. The detention of the human actions depicted on the stage allows the space to recognize the diverse stations that make possible the social context.
For Brecht: “The principle of Epic Theatre: [is] one thing after an other.”[xxxiv] And this statement is set as the final methodology of constructing an experimental world in the theatre piece. The pauses and detentions in his dramaturgy intended to make the distance necessary to recognize the steps in the political frame. Thence, time and structure were primary elements in the recognition of factors in a historical perspective, since it was essential for the pedagogical purpose in Brecht’s dramaturgy.
Brecht understands the world by cause and effects laws.[xxxv] The connections established through history in our social-political circumstances were indispensable to awake in the spectator the feeling of watching something he already knew but from a new perspective.
For Bertolt Brecht: “There is a decision carried out and call for spectator acquiescence.”[xxxvi] Thence, his spectators after attending his plays had a decision to make regarding his social situation. This imperative of being in control of your own existence was possible because of the acknowledgment acquired during the interpretation by Gestus and the distance to reflect delivered by the estrangement effect. This two factor allowed the audience to enter in a state of astonishment and experience the catharsis of ideas to change the world.
Final remarks
After analyzing the concept of catharsis in Aristotle and Brecht dramaturgical vision of theatre. It seems evident that in the history of western theatre. The state of enlighten stimulated by catharsis has been a permanent search from the Greeks into the present times.
Theatre cannot avoid the dramatic motivation of catharsis; it is in its very essence to function in structures, which will arouse the spectator into a different frame of reflection. In Aristotle’s understanding this arousing had the purpose to assist the moral education in the individual, in order to build a better society. In the other hand, Brecht thought that his theatre should arouse the ideas and the mental process of thinking in the audience.
Hus, it is possible to realize that Aristotle and Brecht were not so distance in his dramaturgical and political agendas. In terms of the objectives pursued. Both at the end wanted a better world according to his conception. Aristotle a moral world, and Brecht a political-intelligent world.
Therefore, we can conclude Catharsis has been a dramaturgical device to accomplish political agendas in different periods across history. The manipulation of the spectator both intellectual and emotional at the end; it is one of the basic asses of theatre.
Theatre because of its nature literally and performative encounters multiple possibilities to reach the audience and educate them in different purpose. Theatre, thus, it is open scenery to discuss the political-philosophical image that we visualize for our society.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind, nor Aristotle or Brecht were able to see his vision of theatre completely realized in their contemporary’s situations. Aristotle saw moments of what he thought catharsis should do and how to accomplish it. Brecht experienced successful instants in his plays, where he saw as possible to educate the spectatos.
Although, Brecht in several occasions discussed the problematic situation of people, who were not able to follow the right attitude, when they are in frot of and epic theatre piece. In the same way, as Aristotle settled that some tragedies and some moments on them truly accomplished the major goals of this elevated form of art.
Aristotle and Brecht were strong and lucid dramaturges; although the cultural and theatrical environment were they put out their thoughts did not follow completely their artistic and political agendas. Once again the conflict between theory and practice in theatre has been present. It seems that the distance between what we think should do theatre and what in fact makes is still deep and cryptic. Perhaps not all the theatre practitioners are able to notice the major power existent in the theatrical structure, which can be use to discuss and approach to people that make the world go.
[i] Euripides. Cited by James Jerome Walsh, Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Weakness (United States of America: Columbia University Press, 1963) 16-17.
[ii] Aristotle. Translated and introduced by Kenneth McLeish, Poetics. (London: Dramatic Contexts. NHB, 2008) 9.
[iii] McLeish, vii.
[iv] W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (Great Britain: Duckworth, 2002) 17.
[v] Fortenbaugh, 18.
[vi] McLeish, 27.
[vii] Fortenbaugh, 18.
[viii] Fortenbaugh, 19.
[ix] McLeish, 9.
[x]Fortenbaugh, 19-20.
[xi] Fortenbaugh, 19.
[xii] Fortenbaugh, 18. It seems relevant to add to the concept of cognitive emotions the following quote: “Perhaps we can say that Aristotle understood the way in which emotional response varies according to bodily condition and used this understanding to develop a homoeopathic theory of purgation. In watching and responding to a tragedy the spectator is not only stimulated intellectually. He is also purged in so far as his bodily condition is altered. He undergoes a quasi-medical treatment which improves his disposition in regard to the everyday emotions of fear and pity. (22)
[xiii] Walsh, 92-93.
[xiv] Walsh, 93.
[xv] McLeish, 17.
[xvi] McLeish, 17.
[xvii] Fortenbaugh, 75-76.
[xviii] Andrés Rosler, Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle (United States: Oxford University Press, 2005) 24.
[xix] Rosler, 13.
[xx] Rosler, 18.
[xxi] Rosler, 18.
[xxii] Bertolt Brecht. Cited by John Willet and Ralph Manheim. Bertolt Brecht: Plays, Poetry and Prose. The Collected Plays Volume III Part II (London: Eyre Methuen, 1997) 140.
[xxiii] Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht (London: Verso, 1998) 18.
[xxiv] Bertolt Brecht. Edited and Translated by John Willet, Brecht on Theatre. The development of an aesthetic (Great Britain: Methuen Drama, 1964) 15.
[xxv] Willet, Brecht on theatre, 96.
[xxvi] Willet, Brecht on theatre, 81.
[xxvii] Willet, Brecht on theatre.
[xxviii] Benjamin, 18.
[xxix] Laura Bradley, Brecht and Political Theatre: The Mother on Stage (United States: Oxford University Press, 2006) 6-7.
[xxx] Willet, Bertolt Brecht: Plays, Poetry and Prose, 244.
[xxxi] Benjamin, 4-5.
[xxxii] Willet, 16.
[xxxiii] Benjamin, 3.
[xxxiv] Bertolt Brecht. Edited by John Willet and Ralph Manheim, Bertolt Brecht. Collected Plays. Volume 5 Part II (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980) 107.
35 Willet, Brecht on theatre.
36 Willet, Brecht on theatre, 28.
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